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Abstract: Recent studies found evidence for nominal wage rigidity during periods of 
relatively high wage inflation. It has been argued, however, that in an environment with low 
wage inflation, when nominal wage cuts become customary, workers’ opposition to nominal 
cuts would erode and, hence, firms would no longer hesitate to reduce nominal pay. If this 
argument is valid nominal wage rigidities are largely irrelevant because in a high inflation 
environment there is little need to cut nominal pay while in a low inflation environment the 
necessary cuts would occur.  
To examine this argument we use data from Switzerland where wage inflation has been very 
low for many years in the 1990s. We find that the rigidity of nominal wages is a robust 
phenomenon that does not vanish in a low inflation environment. In addition, it constitutes a 
considerable obstacle to real wage adjustments. In the absence of downward nominal rigidity, 
real wages would indeed be quite responsive to unemployment. Moreover, the wage sweep-
ups caused by nominal rigidity are strongly correlated with unemployment suggesting that 
downward rigidity of nominal wages indeed contributes to unemployment.  
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The extent and the nature of downward nominal wage rigidity is likely to have strong 
implications for the functioning of the labor market and for questions of monetary policy. 
There are several reasons why firms may be reluctant to cut nominal wages. Firms may be 
constrained by efficient nominal wage contracts (MacLeod and Malcomson 1993, Holden 
1999), by the existence of nominal loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Genesove 
and Mayer 1998) or by nominal fairness standards (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1986, 
Campbell and Kamlani 1997, Bewley 1999, Fehr and Falk 1999).  
In this paper we examine two important unresolved questions in the empirical literature on 
nominal wage rigidity. First, there is, to our knowledge, no information regarding the rigidity 
of nominal wages in an environment of low nominal wage growth. This question is important 
because in an environment with high wage inflation there is little need to cut nominal wages 
and, hence, nominal wage rigidity – if it exists – has probably no big real effects. In contrast, 
in a low inflation environment wage rigidity may well be a binding constraint on wage setting 
for large segments of the work force. Hence, non-negligible real effects of nominally rigid 
wages are much more likely in an environment with low nominal wage growth. However, 
little is known about the behavior of wages in this situation.  
Second, there is little empirical support for the claim that nominal wage rigidity affects the 
real side of the economy. Yet, such knowledge is important because even if nominal wage 
cuts are frequently inhibited by nominal rigidity, it cannot be taken for granted that this causes 
real effects. The reason is that many labor relations are long-term so that the employer could, 
in principle, smooth the time path of individual wages without affecting the expected marginal 
costs of labor. For example, in a long-run employment relation a worker could pay for the 
absence of wage cuts in this year by lower wage increases in future years such that the present 
value of his labor costs would remain unaffected. From applications of the theory of repeated 
games to long run labor relations it is, however, known that these relations are characterized 
by infinitely many equilibria (MacLeod and Malcolmson 1989). Therefore, it is far from 
obvious that the equilibria with wage smoothing are the relevant ones. Ultimately, it is thus an 
empirical question whether widespread nominal wage rigidity will be associated with real 
effects.  
Due to the lack of data previous studies were forced to examine the existence of nominal 
wage rigidity in an environment with relatively high rates of wage inflation. The early studies 
by McLaughlin (1994) and Lebow, Stockton, and Washer (1995) found little evidence.  
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Further studies by Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996), Card and Hyslop (1996) and Kahn 
(1997) report more favorable evidence and two recent papers found quite strong evidence for 
downward rigidity (Altonji and Devereux 1999, Lebow, Saks and Wilson 1999). However, 
since all these studies used US data from the last four decades and since was inflation has 
been quite high during this time period it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw reliable 
inferences about the behavior of nominal wages in a low inflation environment from these 
studies.
1 The average rate of wage inflation in these studies ranged from 3.4 percent in 
Lebow, Saks and Wilson (1999) to 7.4 percent in McLaughlin (1994). Moreover, between 
1959 and 1999 annual wage inflation in the US was below 3 percent in only 6 years.
2 Gordon 
(1996) and Mankiw (1996) have forcefully argued that it is very problematic to infer from the 
presence of nominal wage rigidity in a high inflation environment that wages will also exhibit 
nominal rigidity in a low inflation environment. The reason is that the microeconomic 
behavior of workers and firms may well change in response to the change in the 
macroeconomic environment. "The … attempt, to reason from evidence on nominal wage 
rigidity in an environment of rapid positive average nominal wage change to a hypothetical 
situation of zero average nominal wage change is subject to the Lucas critique. If the 
macroeconomic environment were different, microeconomic behavior would be different. 
Nominal wage reductions would no longer be seen as unusual if the average nominal wage 
was not growing. Workers would not see them as unfair, and firms would not shy away from 
imposing them." (Gordon, 1996, p. 62). If this argument is valid there would be little reason to 
be concerned about nominal wage rigidity because in a high inflation environment it is likely 
to have little impact on employment while in a low inflation environment nominal rigidity 
will be absent.  
The empirical results presented in this paper challenge, however, the above argument. We 
provide evidence for the presence of strong nominal wage rigidity in an environment with 
sustained low nominal wage inflation. Our method for examining the extent of nominal wage 
rigidity is similar to the one developed by Altonji and Devereux (1999). However, since their 
empirical model has important counterfactual implications we generalize their method by 
                                                 
1 The most prominent low inflation episode is probably the Great Depression, for which to our knowledge no 
micro-level data on individual wage changes exists. Aggregate evidence suggests that downward nominal wage 
rigidity has played an important role in amplifying (or causing) the Great Depression (Akerlof, Dickens, and 
Perry 1996; Bernanke and Carey 1996).  
2 The years are 1961, 1963, 1986, 1987, 1992, 1993 (see Table B-47, Economic Report of the President 2003).  
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allowing for individual heterogeneity in nominal rigidity. Our model, therefore, does not 
imply counterfactual predictions. Our study is based on the Swiss experience between 1991 
and 1997. During this period Switzerland experienced very low inflation rates in several 
consecutive years. After a rapid decline of average nominal wage growth from 7 percent to 
roughly 1 percent, nominal wage growth remained at such low levels for four years. Thus, 
there was plenty of time for individual agents to adjust their behavior to this macroeconomic 
environment and intense downwards pressure on nominal wages probably prevailed 
throughout this period. Yet, our results indicate that the low inflation environment reduced the 
reluctance to cut nominal wages by only very little. This decrease was far too small to 
accommodate the greater need for nominal wage cuts when inflation approached zero. Instead 
of a decrease in the quantitative relevance of nominal wage rigidity we even observe an 
increase over time. For example, in 1991, when Swiss wage inflation was equal to wage 
inflation in a typical year of the US studies, nominal rigidity prevented wage cuts for one third 
of the job stayers and the average prevented wage decrease for these workers was 2.7 percent. 
These results are similar to the ones reported in Altonji and Devereux (1999). In contrast, in 
1997, after four years of low wage inflation, the fraction of job stayers who did not receive 
wage cuts due to nominal rigidity was 62 percent and the average prevented wage decrease for 
these workers was 6.5 percent. These results leave little doubt that the rigidity of nominal 
wages was very persistent in these years. Moreover, our results also show that in the absence 
of nominal wage rigidity real wages would have been quite flexible. This indicates that 
nominal wage rigidity was an important determinant of real wages in an environment with 
low nominal wage growth.  
In view of this result it is interesting to ask whether nominal wage rigidity is associated with 
important real effects. Previous research has either not dealt explicitly with this question or 
has found no strong effects. At the micro-level Altonji and Devereux (1999) found evidence 
that workers who are protected by a nominal wage floor are less likely to quit. Whether 
nominal rigidity also affects layoffs, promotions, and relative wage growth remains, according 
to these authors, an open question. For the macro-level there seems to be even less evidence. 
To our knowledge, so far there exists no evidence suggesting that nominal wage rigidity is 
associated with higher unemployment. The recent paper by Lebow, Saks and Wilson (1999) 
even poses a so-called micro-macro puzzle. They found that despite the large wage sweep-ups 
caused by nominal wage rigidity in the US in the 1980s the unemployment rate even 
decreased in this period. Moreover, the paper reports that their measure of nominal rigidity is 
insignificant in Phillips curve estimates suggesting that nominal rigidity may be unimportant 
at the macro-level. However, in view of our arguments above it could also be the case that  
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nominal wage rigidity has only small effects in an environment with relatively high nominal 
growth while it may well cause important real effects in a low-growth environment.  
To examine whether nominal wage rigidity is associated with unemployment we have 
computed the average wage sweep-up caused by nominal rigidity for every canton and every 
industry in Switzerland in each year between 1991 and 1997 (Switzerland is a highly 
decentralized federation that consists of 26 cantons). This enables us to see whether the wage 
increasing effect of nominal rigidity is related to the unemployment rates in the different 
cantons and industries. Our analysis yields a striking result: In every single canton and in most 
industries we observe a positive relation between the unemployment rate and the average 
wage sweep-up caused by nominal rigidity. Our best interpretation of this result is that the 
wage sweep-ups indeed represent sweep-ups in labor costs, which induce firms to lay off 
workers.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the characteristics of 
the Swiss labor market. Section 3 provides descriptive evidence on wage rigidity from 
personnel files and Section 4 shows descriptive evidence from representative random samples. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical model of wage changes applied in our paper. Section 6 
shows to what extent nominal rigidity persists in our low growth environment and discusses 
the real consequences on unemployment. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  Characteristics of the Swiss Labor Market 
The Swiss labor market is one of the least regulated and least unionized labor markets in 
Europe. In Switzerland employers have, for example, the legal possibility to enforce wage 
cuts by proposing a lower nominal wage to incumbent workers. If a worker refuses to accept 
the new wage, the law allows the employer to fire the worker. This employer right is non-
waiveable, i.e., it cannot be given up in a contract, in stark contrast to most other European 
countries. In this respect, the Swiss labor market is perhaps closer to the US labor market than 
to the labor markets in most other European countries. Despite the employers’ opportunities 
of firing individual workers nominal wage rigidity may nevertheless occur if behavioral forces 
like nominal fairness standards and nominal loss aversion are sufficiently strong. For our 
purposes, the most important feature of the Swiss situation is a dramatic decline in nominal 
wage growth between 1991 and 1993 (accompanied by a decline in real GDP growth), 
followed by four years of very low inflation rates. Between 1994 and 1997, nominal wage  
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growth never exceeded 1.5 percent. Low wage inflation implies that structural changes in the 
economy are likely to be associated with the necessity to cut the nominal wages of many 
workers. The downward pressure on nominal wages of many workers means that firms face a 
strong temptation to cut the nominal wages of these workers, and, consequently, nominal 
wage cuts should become more customary. This is the ideal situation to examine whether 
nominal wage rigidity indeed erodes. When, if not in this situation, can we expect an erosion 
of nominal wage rigidity? On the other hand, if nominal rigidity persists, this is the ideal 
environment for the study of the real consequences of nominal rigidity because nominal 
rigidity prevents many real wage cuts. 
It is instructive to compare the macro-environment in this study with the macro-environment 
in previous studies of nominal wage rigidity. When we examine nominal wage growth in the 
US between 1965 and 1999, we find no comparable episode with such a rapid decline in wage 
inflation, followed by a sustained low level of wage inflation below 1.5%. (Table B47, 
Economic Report of the President, 2003). Even during the 1990s, when inflation was 
relatively low, in eight out of 10 years wage inflation was 3 percent or higher.  
 
3.  Descriptive Evidence from Personnel Files 
The ideal data set for examining nominal wage rigidity would be a representative sample of 
firms’ personnel files including precise information on wages, individuals’ productivity and 
other individual characteristics. Unfortunately, to our knowledge there is no study with such a 
data set. Although less informative it is still useful to examine non-representative firm-level 
information. We obtained personnel records from a large and a medium-sized Swiss firm. 
Firm A is a large firm in the service industry with approximately 10,000 employees. The 
available personnel records cover the period from 1993 to 1999. For both firms wages are 
calculated as total compensation divided by hours in the contract. Average wage growth in 
Firm A was 3.8 percent (s.d.: 5.3 percent). Firm B is a medium-sized firm in the service 
industry with a declining activity in manufacturing. The records of Firm B start in 1984 and 
end in 1999. In this firm employment drops from about 2000 in the 1980s to 1000 in 1998, 
from where it started to rise again. Wages grew on average by 5.7 percent (s.d.: 5 percent) in 
Firm B.  
Figure 1 displays the distribution of wage changes (measured in log wage differences) in the 
two firms for the periods 1993 – 1999 and 1984 – 1998, respectively. The striking feature of  
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both distributions is, that there are almost no wage cuts. In Firm A (N=35,779), only 1.7 
percent of all observations are wage cuts. In Firm B (N=20,236), the fraction is even lower 
(0.4 percent). Both distributions exhibit a discontinuity at zero that could hardly be more 
pronounced. If we restrict our attention to the years with low nominal wage growth the picture 
is essentially the same. Between 1993 and 1997 average nominal wage growth was also 3.8 
percent in Firm A and the percentage of negative wage changes was 1.5. Firm B experienced 
4.2 percent average nominal wage growth in this period and the percentage of wage cuts was 
again 0.4 percent. Therefore, irrespective of the period considered nominal wage cuts are 
extremely rare in these firms. These data are, thus, certainly consistent with the view that 
employers are reluctant to cut nominal wages. Yet, it is unclear to what extent the wage 
change regularities in these firms are representative for the whole economy.  
 
4.  Descriptive Evidence from Representative Samples 
To get representative information on the extent of nominal rigidity we examine two large data 
sets. The first data source is the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) for the years 1991 – 1998. 
The SLFS is a rotating panel that follows individuals for five years. In total, the SLFS 
provides 21,144 wage change observations. The second data source is a large random sample 
from the Social Insurance Files (SIF). The SIF contains information about all employees in 
Switzerland. This sample gives us 140,628 observations of wage changes and covers 
essentially the same time period as the SLFS-data
3. The major advantage of examining both 
data sets is that this provides a very useful robustness check of our results. Below we will 
show that both data sources have their specific advantages and disadvantages. Hence, if both 
data sources nevertheless lead to similar results we can be more confident that the results are 
robust. 
In both data sources we consider non-self employed individuals who stayed with the same 
firm for at least one year. We call these individuals “job stayers”. We trimmed both samples 
by excluding all observations with an absolute wage change above 50 percent. This is 
motivated by the concern that for job stayers wage changes exceeding 50 percent are utterly 
implausible. In both data sets we lose approximately 3 percent of the observations when we 
                                                 
3 The Social Insurance Files are December to December data, while the SLFS is conducted in May. Hence, 
referring to wage changes in e.g. 1993, we mean wage changes between May 1993 and May 1994 for the SLFS 
and wage changes between December 1992 and December 1993 for the SIF.  
  7
apply this criterion. However all our conclusions remain qualitatively identical and 
quantitatively very similar if we use the whole sample for our estimates. For the SLFS-data 
our measure of wages is total compensation (net of social security contributions) divided by 
hours specified in the labor contract. For the SIF-sample we use a different measure of wages 
as discussed below.  
The advantage of the SLFS is that it provides extensive information on the characteristics of 
individuals like, e.g., tenure, labor market experience, education levels, gender, age, 
nationality, etc. The disadvantage is that surveys are likely to be distorted by reporting errors. 
The advantage of the SIF-data is that all financial transactions between firms and workers are 
recorded in the Social Insurance Files. Hence, reporting error is not an issue. The earnings 
information obtained from the SIF is accurate. In addition, the SIF-sample is comfortably 
large. Since the SIF data covers the same period of time as the SLFS-data, we can replicate 
the empirical analysis we conduct with the SLFS. We should also mention that the SIF-data 
have three problems. First, it is impossible to identify job stayers with absolute certainty. We 
only consider those workers in the SIF-sample who were insured by the same local social 
insurance agency in two consecutive years since these are most likely to be job stayers. 
However, if a worker moves to another employer, but both employers are associated with the 
same local agency, the individual may still be included in our sample. Thus, we may wrongly 
include job movers in our SIF-sample, which could understate the true degree of nominal 
wage rigidity. Second, we have precise information on total compensation per year but not on 
hours worked. Our measure of observed wage changes in the SIF-sample is, therefore, given 
by the changes in total compensation per year. Hence, temporary variations in hours, which 
arise, e.g., through different overtime in two years, look like a ‘wage change' in our sample. 
As we will illustrate below, this can generate a substantial number of observations that look 
like a wage cut but which are indeed reductions in actual hours worked. This is particularly 
important for the time period considered because in a recession firms may use working time 
reductions as an alternative to nominal cuts. Third, the available worker characteristics in the 
SIF-sample are not the same as in the SLFS. They include age, nationality, gender, details on 
the agency that recorded the payment and the period of time to which it applies.  
Figure 2 summarizes the distribution of nominal wage changes (measured in log wage 
differences) for job stayers in Switzerland between 1991 and 1997. Consider first the figure 
on the left which displays the histogram obtained from the SLFS. This histogram exhibits the 
following properties:   
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1.  There is a spike at zero: The largest bin is the one containing no or small positive 
nominal wage changes (between zero and 2 percent).  
2.  There is an asymmetry in the distribution of wage changes. Small negative wage 
changes are observed less frequently than small positive wage changes. 
3.  Despite the asymmetry there is a considerable fraction of negative wage changes. 
Compare this to the right panel of Figure 1a, which is based on the SIF data using identical 
bins. Three features deserve to be mentioned here:  
1.  The SIF distribution exhibits less dispersion, i.e., it is more centered around zero than 
the SLFS distribution. While, e.g., 59 percent of all observations in the SIF are 
between zero and 10 percent, the corresponding figure for the SLFS is only 45 percent. 
2.  The asymmetry between positive and negative wage changes is much more 
pronounced in the SIF sample. There is a striking discontinuity around zero and the 
pile-up of observations just above zero is very pronounced. 
3.  The fraction of negative wage changes is considerably smaller in the SIF-sample.  
 
Table 1 provides additional information on wage changes in our two data sources together 
with the inflation rate (measured by CPI changes) and average nominal wage growth. The 
table shows that, at the beginning of the period considered, the sharp decrease in the rate of 
inflation is associated with more observed wage cuts and more zero wage changes in the 
SLFS. The fraction of job stayers with a zero nominal wage change rises from 5 percent in 
1991 to 15 percent in 1997. The fraction who reported wages that implied wage cuts is, in 
general, quite high. It also rises from 20 percent in 1991 to 33 percent in 1997. Interestingly, 
however, the fraction of workers with wage cuts is always lower in the SIF-sample than in the 
SLFS-sample. This suggests that reporting error is important in the labor force survey: 
Imagine that the distribution of true wage changes has no, or only a few, negative entries. 
Assume further that reporting error is important. Then, as the distribution moves closer to zero 
over time, reporting error creates a larger number of negative observations. Therefore, we 
observe more wage cuts in the SLFS sample. Note that the fact that we cannot control for 
hours variation in the SIF sample only strengthens this argument because it is likely to 
produce false negatives in this sample, too, a point to which we return below. 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the distribution of log wage differences over time, using the 
SIF sample. The sequence of distributions conveys the impression that the decline in inflation  
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is associated with a rise in downward rigidity. Consider, first, the three panels for 1991, 1992, 
and 1993. In these years the distribution is – except for the small spike at zero - relatively 
symmetric around its median. The bins to the left and to the right of the median are of similar 
size. Compare this to the distribution of wage changes in the low inflation years 1995 to 1997, 
where the median is much closer to zero. In these years there is a sharp discontinuity at zero 
and the distribution also exhibits a pronounced asymmetry around zero. Note also that there is 
only a relatively small increase in the frequency of negative wage changes during these years.  
The upshot of the descriptive evidence in Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3 can be summarized as 
follows: The asymmetry in the distribution of wage changes and the spike at zero may be 
interpreted as an indication of nominal wage rigidity. Support for this interpretation is also 
provided by the fact that the asymmetry becomes much more pronounced over the years. 
However, the relatively large fraction of observed wage cuts in the SLFS and the SIF provide 
much less convincing evidence for nominal wage rigidity than the descriptive evidence from 
the personnel files. This raises the question whether the non-negligible number of observed 
wage cuts represent true wage cuts or whether they are mainly the result of reporting error (in 
the SLFS) or of unobserved hours variation (in the SIF). The much smaller number of 
observed wage cuts and the generally smaller dispersion of wage changes in the SIF suggests 
that reporting error is a serious problem at least in the SFLS. Thus, many of the observed 
wage cuts in the SLFS might be spurious. In addition, the absence of a direct measure for 
working time in the SIF may pollute the SIF data in a similar way as reporting error pollutes 
the SLFS data.  
In order to gain some insights into the potential role of unobserved variations in working time 
we took advantage of the fact that the personnel file of Firm B provides precise information 
on overtime payments for each individual. Therefore, we could compute the distribution of 
wage changes in Firm B in the presence and in the absence of controlling for overtime 
payments. The results show that if on does not control for variations in overtime a sizeable 
fraction of spurious wage cuts (7.6 percent) occur. In addition, the true wage change 
distribution is much more centered around zero than the “polluted” distribution.  
 
5.   An Empirical Model of Wage Changes  
The upshot of the previous discussion is that we need an econometric model that explicitly 
allows for the presence of measurement error so that one can separate true wage changes from  
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wage changes that merely reflect reporting error or reductions in actual hours worked. The 
general idea behind our model is that there may be reasons – e.g., efficient nominal wage 
contracts, nominal fairness standards and nominal loss aversion – that render nominal wage 
cuts costly for the firms. Therefore, firms will not implement all desired wage cuts and, as a 
consequence, there will be a difference between the desired or “notional” wage cuts and 
actually implemented wage cuts. However, the larger the notional wage cut the more likely it 
is that the benefits will outweigh the costs. Hence, for individual i at time t there may exist a 
threshold value cit, which, together with the notional wage cut, determines whether the actual 
wage will be cut or not. If the notional wage cut is below cit the firm will not implement the 
cut but if the notional cut is above cit the pay reduction will be implemented. Our main focus 
is to estimate the mean µc and the variance σc of the distribution of thresholds. Since we also 
estimate the distribution of measurement errors and the distribution of notional wage changes 
we can compute the frequency of true wage cuts and the share of workers who is affected by 
nominal rigidity. Workers are affected by nominal rigidity if their notional wage change is 
negative but since the notional wage cut is below their threshold cit their actual wage is not 
cut.  
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where  it y ∆  is the observed log nominal wage change of individual i in period t,  it it e b x + ' i s  
the notional nominal wage change that would be implemented in the absence of downward 
nominal wage rigidity,  it x  is a set of observable variables that are likely to affect wage 
growth,  it e  represents the usual error term, and  it m  denotes the measurement error, which can 
be interpreted as reporting error in the SLFS and unobserved hours variation in the SIF. 
Model (1) is similar to, but more general than, the model in Altonji and Devereux (1999). A 
main difference between our approach and the one taken by Altonji and Devereux is that we 
allow for individual heterogeneity in the thresholds cit whereas Altonji and Devereux impose 
the restriction that the threshold is the same for all workers. This restriction counterfactually 
implies that there are no wage change observations in the interval [-c, 0]. By allowing for 
individual heterogeneity in wage cut thresholds we avoid such counterfactual implications. 
There is questionnaire evidence (Shafir, Tversky and Diamond 1997) and experimental 
evidence (Fehr and Gächter 2000, Fehr and Tyran 2001) indicating that individuals differ with 
regard to their fairness standards and their degree of money illusion. Thus, individual  
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heterogeneity may be important so that some workers may have flexible wages while others 
have rigid wages. In our model, those workers who have a negative threshold (cit < 0) exhibit 
perfectly flexible wages. Note also that our model nests the model of Altonji and Devereux as 
a special case. If the variance of cit goes to zero the two models become identical.   
In addition to allowing for individual heterogeneity we also allow for a nonzero correlation 
between the error term  it e  and the individual thresholds cit and we estimate the value of this 
correlation. This is potentially important because there is considerable survey evidence that 
nominal wage cuts do occur when a firm is in financial distress. Several studies (e.g., Bewley 
1999, Campbell and Kamlani 1997) document this. Individuals are more likely to accept wage 
cuts when their firm is in trouble. Allowing for a nonzero correlation between  it e  and cit offers 
a simple way of incorporating this feature because changes in firm productivity are 
presumably an important component of  it e . Based on the survey evidence one would, 
therefore, expect that if  it e  is very low (negative) a worker’s threshold cit is very small, too, so 
that the correlation between  it e  and cit is positive.  
We also allow for some heterogeneity with regard to reporting error (in the SLFS) and 
overtime work (in the SIF sample). We assume that in every year, a fraction p (that will be 
estimated) of the individual data has no measurement error, but that the rest of the sample 
draws a normally distributed error. This means that in the SLFS a fraction p of all respondents 
states the correct income, but the rest makes normally distributed errors. In analogy, in the SIF 
sample, a fraction p of all individuals has no variation in hours between the previous and the 
current year. 
In our empirical estimates below it is important that  it x  contains variables that capture 
business cycle variation in wages, and individual characteristics correlated with wage growth. 
We use the change in the regional unemployment rate as well as year fixed effects as our 
business cycle variables. Variables that systematically affect wage growth across workers,  are 
labor market experience, age, tenure, and observable skills of worker i (see, e.g., Topel 1991). 
It is a stylized fact that wages grow at a decreasing rate with experience and tenure. Likewise, 
several studies indicate that wage growth is different for different types of workers (e.g. 
Baker, Gibbs and Holmström 1994). As an additional control we also included the firm size 
because there is evidence for firm size effects in Switzerland (Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller 
1999). In our estimates with the SIF sample we use a worker’s age as a proxy for experience. 
In addition, a foreigner dummy variable, as well as an interaction term with log age, captures 
the systematic differences in experience and job status between Swiss employees and 
employees from other countries.   
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Intuitively, our estimator examines whether individuals with low predicted real wage growth 
in high-inflation years have on average higher than expected wage growth during low-
inflation years because their characteristics required a cut in their nominal wage. Thus, it 
examines whether an individual’s observed wage change is higher than expected when its 
characteristics would have predicted a wage cut. This, together with the addition of symmetric 
measurement error, identifies the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity. Notice that this 
identification is not biased towards finding downward nominal wage rigidity. If predicted vs. 
actual wage growth in low-inflation years do not differ from predicted vs. actual wage growth 
in high-inflation years, the estimator will conclude that there is no – or very little – downward 
nominal wage rigidity and leave this part of the model unidentified. Because the estimator 
identifies downward nominal wage rigidity by assessing the local asymmetry around zero, it 
will only imperfectly capture rigidity in wages that stem, e.g., from multi-year contracts. If 
there are significant costs of renegotiating a contract, then it is optimal to have a longer 
contract period when inflation is low because the benefits from frequent wage adjustments are 
small relative to the cost. The important point here is that this kind of rigidity prevents both 
small nominal wage decreases as well as increases. Thus, multi-year contracts will not lead to 
an asymmetry around zero, and will not be fully reflected in our estimates. We believe, 
however, that this kind of wage rigidity is rather unimportant in Switzerland because multi-
year contracts are rarely observed. Moreover, the histograms in Figure 2 and 3 exhibit a 
pronounced asymmetry around zero wage changes because small wage decreases are much 
less frequent than small wage increases. 
Observed wage changes can, in principle, fall into one of the following three regimes:  
(i) If the notional wage change  it it e b x + '  is positive there are no forces that inhibit this wage 
change, i. e., we observe  ' it it it x be m ++ in the data (see (1) above) and the likelihood of this 
occurring is 
(' | '0 ) e m it it it it fy x b x b e + ∆− + > 
where () em f + ⋅  is the density of the sum of e and m.  
(ii) If  it it e b x + '  lies between -cit and zero, the firm will not cut the worker's wage but give him 
a pay freeze instead. The observed ‘wage change' is then entirely due to unobserved variation. 
Hence the likelihood of falling in this regime only depends on the distribution of m and is 
given by 
) 0 e b ' x c | y ( f it it it it m < + < − ∆   
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Note that we do not assume that sufficiently small notional wage cuts result in a pay freeze. 
Whether a notional wage cut is executed or not depends on the distribution of cit, whose 
parameters are jointly estimated with all other parameters of the model.  
(iii) If the notional wage cut is larger than cit, the firm will implement the wage cut. The 
conditional density for this event is 
) 0 e b ' x , c e b ' x | b ' x y ( f it it it it it it it m e < + − < + − + ∆  
Since it cannot be observed which regime generated a particular observation, the likelihood of 
an observation sums up to  
() ( )
() ( )
() ( ) 0 e b ' x , c e b ' x Pr 0 e b ' x , c e b ' x | b ' x y f
0 e b ' x c Pr 0 e b ' x c | y f
0 e b ' x Pr 0 e b ' x | b ' x y f l
it it it it it it it it it it it it m e
it it it it it it it m
it it it it it it m e it
< + − < + ⋅ < + − < + − +
< + < − ⋅ < + < − +







We assume that e and m are i.i.d. normal and estimate the parameters by maximum 
likelihood.
4  
Our approach nests both the case of perfect wage flexibility and the case of perfect wage 
rigidity. As µc approaches minus infinity, there is no downward wage rigidity and only the 
sum of e and m is identified. If, at the other extreme, µc is very large (and σc finite), there are 
no true wage cuts and the third regime drops out. Hence, the model nests both extreme cases, 
and any intermediate one. It allows for resistance only towards small wage cuts, or larger 
ones. It provides joint estimates of the distribution governing the cost cit of cutting nominal 
wages, and the variance of the distribution of e and m. We should also point out a limitation to 
our model. We assume that the notional wage change in period t does not depend on whether 
the individual’s wage in period t-1 was constrained by downward nominal wage rigidity. To 
see how this could affect our estimator, assume that an individual is hit by a negative 
productivity shock in t-1. But instead of cutting the wage, the firm freezes the individual’s 
wage in t-1 and pays a smaller wage increase in t to undo the rest of the negative shock in t-1. 
This has two implications: First, when we estimate the notional wage changes in t, they will 
be understated. The individual's wage increases by only a little, because of its history. 
Therefore, our estimate of the distribution of notional wage changes will display too little 
variation, which leads us to underestimate the extent of “static” downward nominal wage 
                                                 
4 In an appendix, that is available on request, we derive the explicit expression for (2), that can be directly used 
for estimation purposes.  
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rigidity. Second, however, if yesterday’s wage freeze causes a lower wage increase today 
“static” nominal rigidity may not necessarily be associated with an increase in labor cost. 
“Static” wage rigidity may, therefore, not necessarily cause lower employment. For this 
reason we discuss the employment effects associated with our measure of wage rigidity 
explicitly in section 6.4. 
Finally, our model also enables us to examine important determinants of µc (and σc). Instead 
of imposing the restriction (as in model (1)) that µc is the same for all workers in all years we 
can allow for year-specific µc's or for different µc's for different groups of workers. In 
particular, by estimating year-specific µc's we can observe whether µc is lower in low-inflation 
years, which would provide direct evidence for the validity of the conjecture put forward by 
Gordon (1996) and Mankiw (1996). Also, by allowing variations of µc across different 
categories of workers we can examine, for instance, whether µc is different for full-time and 
part-time workers or for job stayers and job movers. This question is important insofar as the 
role of fairness standards is presumably more relevant the stronger the attachment of workers 
to their firm. If this argument is true we should observe more wage rigidity for job stayers 
than job movers and for full-time workers compared to part-time workers.  
 
6.  Results 
In this section, we discuss the results obtained by estimating the above model. We first 
present the overall tests for the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity. We then 
evaluate the stability of these estimates as inflation becomes very low. Next, we assess the 
implications of the model for different types of workers and the extent to which downward 
wage rigidity prevents real wage cuts. Finally, we examine the consequences of nominal wage 
rigidity for regional and industry-specific unemployment.  
 
6.1 Are Wages Flexible?  
The basic results for both samples are displayed in Table 2. For both samples we estimated 3 
different models. Model (1) estimates µc under the assumption that there is no heterogeneity 
in individual thresholds (σc = 0) and that the correlation between eit and cit, denoted by ρec, is 
zero. In model (2) we also allow for σc ≠ 0 and in model (3) we estimate both σc and ρec. In all 
regressions we control for year effects by including year-dummies and in the SLFS sample we  
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also can control for firm size effects. The major result of Table 2 is that regardless of which 
data set we use and regardless of which model we take, the mean threshold µc is positive and 
significant indicating the existence of nominal wage rigidity. Moreover, in all models where 
we estimated σc the value of σc is significant so that a large percentage of individual 
thresholds is positive. In model (2) for the SIF sample, for instance, the mean threshold is 
0.383 and the standard deviation is 0.21 implying that only about 3 percent of all individuals 
have no positive thresholds. Thus, only about 3 percent of the individuals have perfectly 
flexible wages whereas 97 percent of the individuals exhibit some rigidity. Moreover, 
according to model (2) 91 percent of the individuals have thresholds such that only if the 
notional wage cut is above 10 percent the actual wage will be cut. The quantitative importance 
of nominal wage rigidity is very similar, regardless of whether we use the estimates from the 
SLFS or the SIF, as can be seen in the remaining columns of Table 2. 
The relevance of nominal wage rigidity can be inferred from rows 4 and 5 of Table 2, which 
show the quantitative implications of the estimated distribution of thresholds for the frequency 
of true wage cuts and for the share of workers who would have experienced wage cuts in the 
absence of nominal rigidity. According to the estimates where σc is unconstrained (models (2) 
and (3)) the frequency of true wage cuts is between 7 and 8 percent in the SLFS sample and 
between 6 and 7 percent in the SIF sample. The share of workers who is affected by nominal 
rigidity, i. e., those who experience notional but not actual wage cuts, varies between 48 and 
54 percent. Thus, the quantitative importance of nominal rigidity is high and very robust 
across models and across data sets. Our estimates of model (3) also reveal that ρit is highly 
significant, positive and of the same size for both data sets. This is consistent with the view 
that negative idiosyncratic productivity shocks render people more willing to accept a nominal 
wage cut.  
The extent of measurement error in our survey data is substantial although it is lower than 
expected. Our estimate of the standard deviation σm of the measurement error in the SLFS-
sample is between 6 and 7 percent (see second page of Table 2). This is low compared to what 
validation studies of labor force surveys found for the US (see Angrist and Krueger, 1999 for 
a survey). The standard errors obtained from validation studies for the US are never below 10 
percent, and sometimes considerably larger. In the SIF-sample the measurement error due to 
overtime variations is between 3 and 4 percent. These numbers indicate that it is important to 
take measurement errors into account to generate a true picture of nominal wage rigidity. 
What are our estimates for the determinants of the notional wage changes? We find that a rise 
in experience lowers wage growth (see the estimates for the SLFS sample in Table 2). The  
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estimated coefficient is negative and highly significant. Increasing labor market experience 
from one to ten years decreases wage growth by 2.7 percent. Table 2 also shows that a rise in 
tenure decreases wage growth. The tenure effect is roughly one third of the size of the 
experience effect. Our estimates indicate a much faster decline of wage growth with 
experience than what is obtained from an OLS regression. This should hardly come as a 
surprise, since our model takes into account that small wage cuts, which, e.g., result from a 
decreasing productivity over the life-cycle, may not be implemented but rather turned into a 
wage freeze. This introduces an upward bias into the OLS estimate of the experience profile. 
Table 2 also indicates that the position of workers in the firm’s hierarchy is important for 
wage growth. If the individual is a superior, wage growth is higher while if the individual is a 
member of higher management wage growth is lower.
5  
We also find evidence that the change in the regional unemployment rate causes a substantial 
reduction in notional wage growth. Our estimates imply that a one percentage point increase 
in unemployment growth reduces wage growth by at least 0.7 percentage points in the SLFS 
sample and by 0.8 percentage points in the SIF. The estimates are thus very robust across 
samples and indicate that wages would be quite flexible in the absence of downward wage 
rigidity. We also experimented with the level of the regional unemployment rate in our 
regressions. However, while the change in the unemployment rate has a sizable and 
significant impact on wage growth, the coefficient of the unemployment rate is always rather 
small and insignificant. As with the experience profile above, we find that in OLS regressions, 
the coefficient on the change in the unemployment rate is smaller in magnitude than in our 
model. This indicates that ignoring the impact of downward nominal wage rigidity understates 
the impact of changes in the unemployment rate on notional wage changes.  
In the SIF-sample we find that wage growth strongly declines with age as indicated by the 
negative and highly significant coefficient on log age. The SIF-estimates also shows that wage 
growth is smaller for foreign workers, reflecting most likely systematic differences in job 
status between Swiss and Non-Swiss employees. In addition, the positive coefficient on the 
interaction term between foreigner status and age indicates that wage growth declines less for 
Non-Swiss employees. We also conducted several regressions in which we included a gender 
                                                 
5 A superior is defined as an employee who has the power to direct the activities of several other employees 
without being a member of higher management.   
  17
dummy and interactions between gender and age. However, the inclusion of these control 
variables has little impact on the estimated distribution of thresholds.
6  
 
6.2 Are Nominal Rigidities Easily Malleable? 
This section examines whether nominal wage rigidity tends to vanish in the course of a period 
with persistently low nominal growth. A natural way to test for this is to estimate year-
specific distributions of wage cut thresholds. On the basis of this information we then can 
calculate the share of individuals displaying some nominal rigidity (i.e., cit > 0) and strong 
nominal rigidity (i.e., cit > 0.1). Remember that inflation declined from roughly five percent in 
1991 to zero percent in 1997. Real growth was slightly negative between 1991 and 1993 and 
slightly positive between 1994 and 1996. If nominal rigidity becomes weaker over time we 
should observe a declining impact of nominal rigidity. In an earlier version of this paper (Fehr 
and Goette 2002, Table 4), we report the full results. Due to space limitations we present here 
only the graphical illustrations of these results. Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 4 show the 
percentage of workers exhibiting some (cit > 0) and strong (cit > 0.1) rigidity.
7 For the SIF 
sample the share of individuals displaying strong rigidity is rather stable over the years and 
fluctuates between 88 and 92 percent (see Panel b in Figure 4). For the SLFS sample the share 
declines from 92 to 82 percent between 1991 and 1996. In, 1997 the share is again at 92 
percent (see Panel a in Figure 4). The overall prevalence of downward nominal wage rigidity 
(the fraction of individuals with cit > 0) decreases somewhat from almost 100 percent to about 
90 percent, in both the SLFS and the SIF sample. 
To see whether this was enough to eliminate, or substantially reduce, the impact of downward 
nominal wage rigidity, we calculate the frequency of wage freezes and wage cuts for every 
                                                 
6 For the SLFS sample we also experimented with education variables. In the period under consideration their 
impact on wage growth was, however, insignificant. In view of the severe recession of the Swiss economy 
during this time this is not surprising. However, the lack of information on education other individual 
characteristics in the SIF might be problematic, as one of our discussants pointed out. While the striking 
similarity of the results obtained from the SIF and the SLFS do not necessarily support this conjecture, we 
further explore it in Table A1 of Fehr and Goette (2002). We interact the age profile fully with nationality and 
gender to see whether differences in education and tenure across these demographic groups affect our 
quantitative conclusions. The results in columns (2) and (3) do not point towards a significant bias of this sort: 
They are very close to the baseline results where we omit most of these interactions. The only notable difference 
is that the addition of the interaction terms increases the standard errors of the estimates somewhat, but not by 
much. 
7 Recall that the SLFS is based on May-to-May data. Hence, we use May-to-May changes in the CPI measure of 
inflation. Analogously, we use December-to-December CPI changes whenever we use the SIF data. Therefore, 
inflation rates differ somewhat between panel (a) and (b) of Figure 4.  
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year. The results are presented panels (c) and (d) in Figure 4 Irrespective of the data source, 
we get the same picture: There is essentially no or only a minor increase in the frequency of 
true wage cuts during the sample period. The share of workers who did not receive wage cuts 
due to nominal wage rigidity rises sharply in both samples. Thus,  the small reduction in the 
resistance against wage cuts was not nearly large enough to lead to a meaningful increase in 
the number of nominal wage cuts. Quite the contrary, the share of workers experiencing wage 
freezes because of nominal rigidity is more than twice as large at the end of the sample period. 
 
6.3 Who is most affected? 
There are various reasons why nominal rigidity is likely to be different for different categories 
of workers. First, fairness standards that render nominal wage cuts costly are likely to arise 
through a history of repeated interactions between the worker and the firm. In the absence of 
such a history employers are less likely to feel constrained by fairness standards. Therefore, it 
seems much easier to impose pay cuts on job movers than on job stayers. Second, for a firm 
the loyalty and work morale of full-time workers is, in general, more important than the 
loyalty and work morale of part-time workers. Moreover, the relevance of fairness standards 
is likely to be more important for workers with a greater attachment to the firm. Therefore, 
one would expect more wage rigidity among full-time workers. A third reason is related to the 
theory of efficient nominal wage contracts (MacLeod and Malcomson 1993, Holden 1999). 
These contracts serve the purpose to protect the relation-specific investments of firms and 
workers efficiently. They are therefore more important for those workers who have more 
firm-specific human capital. Job stayers have, by definition, more firm-specific human capital 
than job movers. In addition, it seems likely that full-time workers have more specific human 
capital than part time workers so that efficient nominal wage contracts are more important for 
full-time workers. Therefore, the theory of efficient nominal wage contracts also suggests that 
nominal wage rigidity is more important for job stayers and for full-time workers.  
The results regarding the differences between full-time and part time job stayers are displayed 
in Table 3. As argued above we find large differences between the two groups of employees. 
For part-time job stayers, the estimated mean threshold µc is 0.2 whereas for full-time job 
stayers it is 0.987 (see Table 3). Together with the estimated standard deviations this 
difference translates into sizeable differences of the impact of wage rigidity. For instance, 
only 6.8 percent of the full-time job stayers experience wage cuts while 15.5 percent of part-
time job stayers had to accept wage cuts. Likewise, for 57.2 percent of the full-time job  
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stayers nominal wage rigidity constitutes a binding constraint, that is, there wages would have 
been cut in the absence of nominal rigidity, whereas this is the case for only 48 percent of 
part-time job stayers.  
A similar picture emerges with regard to the difference between job stayers and job movers 
(see Table 3). Job stayers have a much larger average threshold, the frequency of true wage 
cuts is much smaller for them (8.4 percent versus 20.6 percent for job movers), and the share 
of workers for whom nominal rigidity is binding is much larger for job stayers (55.2 percent 
versus 40.6 percent). Thus, taken together, the evidence in this section is consistent with the 
above arguments that predict differences in nominal rigidity across these groups of workers. 
This lends support to the view that fairness standards and efficient nominal wage contracts are 
relevant factors behind the rigidity of nominal wages. 
 
6.4 The Consequences of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity 
Our estimates provide two further pieces of information. First, we can calculate the average 
notional wage cut  it it e b x + '  that did not occur because -cit <  it it e b x + '  ≤ 0  holds. For brevity, 
we call this the average prevented wage cut and denote it by  ( ) 0 w c | w E it
*
it it
* ≤ < − ∆ ∆ , where 
*
it w ∆  ≡  it it e b x + ' . Second, we can compute a measure of the average wage sweep-up due to 
downward wage rigidity 
* () it it Ew w ∆− ∆  where  it w ∆  is the true wage change. The average 
wage sweep-up can be interpreted as the increase in average labor costs due to downward 
rigidity of nominal wages. If this interpretation is correct a rise in the average wage sweep-up 
should be associated with a rise in unemployment or a decline in employment in the different 
industries and cantons.   
Panels (e) and (f) in Figure 4 exhibit the evolution of  ( ) 0 |
* * < ∆ < − ∆ it it it w c w E  for the job 
stayers. The panels show that downward nominal wage rigidity has less impact at the 
beginning of the period considered when inflation was still relatively high. At this time the 
prevented wage cut was roughly 2 percent in both data sets. This changes substantially in 
years where inflation rates are closer to zero. From 1993 onwards, the prevented wage 
reductions are, on the average, 5 percent or more. This shows again that nominal rigidity 
became increasingly important during the period of low nominal growth.  
We now turn to the question whether downward nominal wage rigidity has consequences for 
the real side of the economy. For this purpose we compute the average wage sweep up 
* () it it Ew w ∆− ∆ for every canton and every industry and relate them to the unemployment rate 
in the cantons and the industries. Since there are large variations in the level and in the  
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changes of unemployment across cantons and across industries it is interesting to examine to 
what extent variations in the wage sweep-up can explain these variations in unemployment. 
Note that the changes in the unemployment rate in our sample are almost exclusively driven 
by the changes in the employment level because labor supply was roughly constant. Therefore 
our examination also provides direct insights into the relation between employment and 
average wage sweep-ups across cantons and industries. Note also that in our estimate of the 
wage sweep-up the rate of unemployment is not an explanatory variable. This is important 
because otherwise there would be a relation between wage sweep-up and unemployment by 
construction.
8  
In Figure 5 we plotted the relation between average wage sweep-up and unemployment rate 
for each canton and industry with more than 1 percent of the labor force, relative to the 
canton’s and industry’s mean respectively (in total we lose less than 2 percent of all 
observations by excluding the small cantons). Figure 5 conveys a striking message: We can 
observe an unambiguous positive relation between the wage sweep-up and the unemployment 
rate. It is important to emphasize that a positive relation between the annual unemployment 
rate and the annual wage sweep-up also exists for each canton and for each industry, 
separately (see Fehr and Goette 2002). In addition to Figure 5 we ran the following 
regression:  
  ( ) jt
*
jt jt e w w bE . const u + − + = ∆ ∆  (3) 
where ujt is the rate of unemployment in canton j and year t, and Ejt(.) denotes the average 
wage sweep up in canton j and year t. The OLS estimate of (3) yields a highly significant and 
large positive point estimate of 1.17 for b (s.e. = 0.11, adjusted for clustering on cantons): A 
one percent increase in the wage sweep-up increases unemployment by 1.17 percentage 
points. The R
2 of regression (3) is 0.49 so that variations in the wage sweep-up alone explain 
49 percent of the variance in the unemployment rate. When we add cantonal and year fixed 
effects, the result remains unchanged. The point estimate for b is 1.11 (s.e. = 0.09) when we 
add cantonal fixed effects that control for permanent regional differences in labor market 
conditions. Hence, our result is not driven by permanent regional differences that affect the 
                                                 
8 Remember (from section 6.1) that the level of the unemployment rate does not affect notional wage changes. 
Instead, notional changes are affected by labor market experience, tenure, unemployment growth, age, etc. The 
differences in these variables across cantons and industries determine, together with our estimate of µc and σc, 
the different wage sweep-ups in cantons and industries. Note also that the correlation between cantonal 
(industry) unemployment rates and cantonal (industry) unemployment growth is negligible (-0.01 for the cantons 
and 0.13 for the industries). Hence, the cantonal (industry) wage sweep-ups can be used as an independent 
variable in the explanation of cantonal (industry) unemployment rates.   
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unemployment rate and the wage sweep-up simultaneously. When we add year fixed effects, 
the point estimate of b is again significant and positive (b = 2.24, s.e. = 0.88). The size and the 
standard error of b is now higher. That b remains positive and significant means that the 
estimate of b is not just driven by year effects that affect the wage sweep-up and the 
unemployment rate simultaneously. In fact, the year fixed effects do not add much to the 
explanation of unemployment, once one controls for the wage sweep-up. They mainly blow 
up the standard error of the estimate, rendering the differences between the different estimates 
of b insignificant. In our strictest specification, we add year and cantonal fixed effects to the 
regression and find again a positive and highly significant point estimate of b = 1.69 (s.e. = 
0.44). 
We repeated this exercise for unemployment and wage sweep-ups in different industries (see 
also Fehr and Goette 2002). In all specifications the wage sweep-up has a sizeable and 
significant impact on industry unemployment. Interestingly, the size of b obtained form the 
industry sample is quantitatively very similar to the estimated size of b from the canton 
regressions.  
Thus, Figure 5 and the results of these regressions show that variations in unemployment rates 
across cantons and industries are strongly related to the corresponding variations in wage 
sweep-ups caused by nominal rigidity. This represents strong evidence that in the low 
inflation environment, which characterized the Swiss economy in the 1990s nominal wage 
rigidity had negative employment effects.  
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
It has been argued that in a macro-environment with persistently low nominal wage growth 
the downward rigidity of nominal wages will vanish. Workers will become accustomed to 
more frequent nominal wage cuts and employers will, therefore, not shy away from cutting 
nominal pay. If this argument were valid nominal wage rigidity would be largely irrelevant 
because in an environment with high wage inflation there is little need to cut nominal pay to 
achieve real wage adjustments while in a low inflation environment nominal rigidity would be 
absent.  
This paper uses three different data sources to examine this conjecture for the Swiss situation 
between 1991 and 1997. During this time Switzerland went through a unique macroeconomic 
phase with a rapid decline in wage inflation, and four years of intense pressure on nominal  
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wages that never allowed nominal wage growth to exceed 1.5 percent. All three data sources 
used in our paper show that nominal wage rigidity also persists in periods of low wage 
inflation. According to the personnel files of two firms wage cuts almost never occur. The 
data from the Swiss Labor Force Survey indicate that at most 8 percent of the job stayers 
receive wage cuts while nominal rigidity prevents wage cuts for 50 or more percent of the job 
stayers. The data from the Social Insurance Files suggest even fewer wage cuts. Our estimates 
also show that the impact of nominal rigidity does not decline in this period of sustained low 
inflation. While there was a tiny increase in the fraction of employees willing to take wage 
cuts, this increase was far too small to accommodate the greater need for wage cuts. The 
fraction of workers whose wages are not cut because of nominal rigidity increases 
considerably over time while the frequency of true wage cuts is roughly constant. This 
indicates that, although the downward pressure on nominal wages increased over time, the 
downward rigidity of nominal wages remained a binding constraint for many employees. 
Moreover, the relatively large coefficient on the unemployment change in our wage growth 
equation suggests that in the absence of nominal rigidity wages would be quite flexible.  
Theories of nominal wage rigidity that are based on the existence of efficient nominal 
contracts or on nominal fairness standards in repeated work relations predict that the wages of 
job movers show less rigidity than the wages of job stayers. These theories also suggest that 
the wages of part-time workers exhibit less rigidity than the wages of full-time workers. Our 
results confirm these predictions and lend thus support to these theories. 
Our examination also suggests that nominal wage rigidity has important macroeconomic 
effects in an environment with low real wage growth and low inflation. The wage sweep-up 
due to nominally rigid wages explains a large part of the variations in the rate of 
unemployment across industries and cantons: The higher the wage sweep-up the higher is the 
unemployment rate. This lends support to the view that the downward rigidity of nominal 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF WAGE FREEZES AND WAGE CUTS  
 
 
      
SOURCE: SWISS LABOR FORCE SURVEY 
 
 



























             
1991  4.7%  7%  0.05  0.20  2,941 0.02 0.11  18,450 
             
1992  3.7%  4.7%  0.08  0.29  3,337 0.02 0.15  20,087 
             
1993  1.1%  2.5%  0.09  0.31  3,476 0.03 0.20  20,870 
             
1994  1.6%  1.5%  0.06  0.31  3,379 0.05 0.21  20,699 
             
1995  0.9%  1.5%  0.06  0.31  2,606 0.04 0.25  19,556 
             
1996 
 
0.6%  1.3%  0.14  0.38  2,742 0.05 0.26  20,285 
1997 
 
0%  0.5%  0.15  0.33  2,754 0.09 0.31  20,681 
Sources: Federal Office of Statistics, Swiss Labour Force Survey 1991 – 1998, Social Insurance Files 1990 - 1997; own calculations.  
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.268** 0.513** 12.01* .208** 0.383**  0.89**  Mean Threshold for 
wage cuts  c µ  
 
 
(.006) (0.06) (5.34) (.002) (0.01) (0.03) 
Standard Deviation  c σ  
(Conditional Standard 











Correlation of cit with 
idiosyncratic wage 








d  0.48** 
(0.025) 
 
Implied Frequency of 















Share of Workers 
affected by Nominal 














        
      
-.012** -.017** -.02**  -  -  -  Log Experience 
(.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002)      
-.005** -0.004* -0.004* -  -  -  Log Tenure 
(.002) 
 









- - - 
(dummy variable) 
 
      
Individual is member  







- - - 
(dummy  variable)         
-.007*  -.007*  -.0082* -.008** -.008** -.008**  Change in regional 
Unemployment Rate 
 
(.004)  (0.003) (0.004) (.003)  (0.002) (0.002) 
- - - -1.12**  -1.15**  -1.21**  Log(Age) 
 
 
   (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
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TABLE 2, CONT. 




   (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
- - -   -0.07**  -0.07**  Foreigner (dummy 
variable) 
 









0.121 0.118 0.137 0.113 0.115 0.139  σ e 
      
σ m 
 
0.073 0.058 0.061 0.041 0.033 0.033 
 p 
 





























































Notes: a. standard errors in parenthesis, adjusted for clustering on cantons and years. *, ** 
denotes significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively. 
 b.  σe and σm denote the standard deviation of eit and mit, respectively. 
  c. Model with  c σ = 0 corresponds to the model estimated in Altonji and Devereux 
(1999).  
  d. Correlation of cit with idiosyncratic wage change eit is restricted to zero.   
 
 
TABLE 3: NOMINAL RIGIDITIES FOR DIFFERENT GROUPS OF WORKERS   
ML ESTIMATES FROM SWISS LABOR FORCE SURVEY, 1991 – 1997 
 F ULL-TIME VS.  
PART-TIME WORK 














        
Mean Threshold for Wage 









        
Standard Deviation of 











      
Share of Individuals 
Displaying  
      
        
Some nominal rigidity
c 0.923  0.905  0.917  0.917 
        
Strong nominal rigidity
d 0.901  0.748  0.879  0.487 
        
Frequency of Wage 
Freezes and Wage Cuts 
      
        
Frequency of Wage Cuts  0.068  0.155  0.084  0.206 
        
Frequency of Wage 
Freezes 
0.572 0.48  0.552  0.406 
        
        
0.139   0.145    σ e 
        
σ m  0.058   0.059   
 















Notes:   a. standard errors in parenthesis, adjusted for clustering on cantons and years. 
    *, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively.  
b. Same specification as in Table 3, column (2).  
c. Some rigidity is defined by a positive threshold wage cut (cit > 0). 










Figure 1: Distribution of Nominal Wage Changes
Evidence from Personnel Files
Firm A, 1993 - 1998 (N=35,779)





Firm B, 1984 - 1998 (N=20,236)










Figure 2: Distribution of Nominal Wage Changes
Evidence from Representative Samples, Switzerland 1991 - 1997
Swiss Labor Force Survey (N=21,144)





Social Insurance Files (N=140,628)










Figure 3: Distribution of Wage Changes over Time
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Panel (c): The Extent of 
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FIGURE 4: ARE NOMINAL RIGIDITIES FADING?  
 
Figure 5: Average Wage Sweep-Up and Unemployment
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